Kurds & Formation of Central Government in Iran-Second Edition

(Online Book)

By: Sam Ghandchi

کردها و شکل گيري دولت مرکزي در ايران-ويرايش دوم

Kurds & Formation of Central Government in Iran-Second Edition

Sam Ghandchi

Table of Contents

00. Preface

01. Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion

02. Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion

03. Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty

04. Kurds in Modern Iran-Till Nader Shah

05. Kurds in Modern Iran-Nader Shah-Mashrootiat

06. Shi’a Clergy in Mashrootiat-A Brief Note

07. Kurds in Modern Iran-Mashrootiat-Reza Shah

08. Kurds in Modern Iran-Reza Shah-IRI

09. The Theory of Greater Kurdestan

10. Tribes and Tribalism

11. Final Word

Appendix 1-Kurdestan's Agriculture

Appendix 2-Komala and Kurdestan

Appendix 3-Does Federalism Allow States To Deny Human Rights

Appendix 4-Federalism is the Lesson of 21-Azar

00. Preface 2005

The following is a research work of mine on the history of presence of Kurds in Iran's central governments from the time of Mahd Dynasty. This work is not intended for review of people's movements and those movements are only noted when related to the main topic of the formation of the central government in Iran.
 
Furthermore this analysis of Iran's history shows why I believe a federal government is more appropriate for Iran.  I have thoroughly explained my understanding of federalism in the Appendix 6 of this book that I wrote in Oct 2005, that federalism does not mean ethnic government and it means checks and balances at the state and local level whether it be the state government, state legislature, or state judicial courts, they are all to democratic contain and moderate the power of the central government.
 
I did this study a long time ago in 1981, but never published wrote this paper. I posted this as a series on SCI (soc.culture.iranian) Usenet newsgroup,  in 1994. I am sure scholarly works on this topic. I hope my work to be of use to the current researchers.
 
As far as the issue of creating the state of Greater Kurdestan, I believe that even if the Kurds get separated from Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, etc; I seriously doubt it if they would form *one* state together. Even if separations happen, the result would be a number of Kurdish states, the same way that we currently have many Arab states in the region, and all the theories of Pan-Arabism never succeeded to create a unified Arab state.
 
As far as separation, I think the Kurdestan of Iraq would have the hardest time, because there are many oil wells located in the Kurdestan of Iraq. In a way, Kurdestan of Iraq is like Khuzestan of Iran. Just as Iran would never allow Khuzestan to separate from Iran, Iraq has a lot to lose if letting its Kurdestan to separate. Again, I do not know enough about Kurdestan of Iraq to pass an opinion as to how it may develop or what would be to its advantage.
 
I personally do not think it is to the advantage of Kurdestan of Iran to separate from the rest of Iran. I think if such a separation happens, the Iranian Kurdestan will become a poor country even poorer than the current Afghanestan. It is to the advantage of Iran as a whole to become a federal state, and it is to the advantage of Iran's Kurdestan to be one state within that federation. This is what I am arguing for in my research below, for the Kurdestan and the rest of Iran.
 
As I have shown in this paper, the Kurdestans of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria were all part of the Ottoman Empire and they had a separate economic and political development from the Kurdestan of Iran, even before the Safavid Dynasty, and since times before the Safavids, they have lived apart from the Iranian Kurdestan. In fact the rule of Ardalans in Iranian Kurdestan goes back to the time of Moghol invasion, even before the fall of Abassid dynasty.
 
As far as the Kurdestans of Iraq or Turkey are concerned, and whether their unification into one single country is to their advantage, or what the best course of development for them is, I really have no idea. My conclusions are just about Kurdestan of Iran, which I believe has the most to gain by being part of an Iranian Federal Government, and has a lot to lose, by becoming part of any scheme to make it part of any state of Greater Kurdestan.

November 25, 2004
Sam Ghandchi, Publisher/Editor
IRANSCOPE
http://www.iranscope.com

01. Mahd Dynasty to Arab Invasion

"One of the earliest civilizations of the world developed in Kurdestan.  With the formation of the Median State in the first millennium BC, this region became especially important.  The area which is now Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdestan formed the Western part, that is, one of the three parts of the Median territory and was called "Mahd Atro-paten" [History of Mahd, A.M. Diakonov, Keshavarz Trans., P.79].  Production in these areas was more advanced than the northern and western parts of Median territory.  [ibid P.182]. According to Diakanov, the Russian historian, in the Western Media, a non-Iranian language called "Kutie" was spoken from the ninth to the seventh century BC, ... and Iranian languages prevailed only in the Eastern parts, which included the present-day Tehran area (Rey) and Esfahan.  The "Kutie" language is regarded by other historians as one of the Iranian languages, from which the Kurdish language has stemmed [ibid, P.146].

The tribes inhabiting Western Media played an important role in the Median civilization and it seems that since the time of the founding of Mahd Dynasty, the Kurdish people have not had such a strong presence in the central governments of Iran.

In 550BC, Ekbatana (where now Hamadan is), the capital of the Mahd Dynasty, was taken by Cyrus, the Achaemenian, and thus ended the reign of the Mahd.  From the formation of the Achaemenian State, with Cyrus as its first chief, to the Muslim invasion of Iran (642AD), that is, for one thousand years, it is the tribes of central Iran, particularly the Pars's (Persian proper) who occupied the dominant position in the central governments.  According to Herodotus, the Greek historian, the Persians had chafed at the Median rule long before they came into positions of leadership and overthrew it" [History of Iran, Pigolovskay et al, Keshavarz Trans P.16].

Pigolovskay writes that in the new, Achaemenian government, the Medians continued to hold important positions along with with the Persians, that Ekbatana also served as the capital of the (FIRST) Persians, and it was further reinforced and made into an exceppent fortress [ibid, P16].

With invasion of Iran by Alexander of Macedonia (330 BC), the "First Persians" (Achaemenians) fell and 83 years of Greek rule (Selokids) started.  This rule ended in 250 BC, with creation of the Ashkonid State.  The Ashkanis (Parthians) were North-Iranians, who enjoyed popular support in fighting the Selokid.  During the reign of Parthians, the western part of Iran found more significance and after the conquering the Central Asia, this dynasty became a world power and Hamadan was their summer capital   The Ashkanic rule disintegrated 474 years after it was founded, presumably under repeated invasions from Romans, in 224AD, the Sasanid Dynasty was founded.  The Sasanids have also been called “The Second Persians”. [ibid P.56]

Ardashir Papakan (or Babakan, son of Babak), the first Sasanid king, was grandson to Sasan, related to the Achaemenian royal family and Guardian of the Annahita Temple.  With the accession of Ardeshir to the thrown, the Persians again became the mainstay of the central government.  In this period, too, which ends with the Muslim conquest of 642AD western Iran continues to be an important region of the Iranian empire.  During the reign of Sasanids, the dominance of Pars's in Iran's central government became more and more established.  Seven main families of Sasan, Karen, Mehran, Zanj, Ahkenids, and Sooren were at the head of Iranian state.  The capital of the Sasanids was Tisfun, or Madayen, near where Baghdad is situated. [ibid P.522]

Thus from the time of the fall of Mahd Dynasty till the victory of Arabs (642AD), the central government of Iran was mainly composed of Pars's, but the western part of Iran (including Kurdestan) was nonetheless one of the main regions of Iranian civilization and most of Iranian capitals were located in that region.

02. Arab Invasion to Moghol Invasion

Following the Arab Invasion, at the time of Khalif Omar, the state power based on the tribal Arab aristocracy was formed in Iran. The power passed into the hands of the Omayid, and Iran became dependent on them. The Omayid rule signified total Arab domination of Iran. On the other hand, it served as a stimulus to popular uprisings as well as rebellions by Iranian feudals. Iranians played an effective role in the overthrow of the Omayid rule (133H.) and the bring into power of Abbasids. The rebellion of Abu Moslem Khorasani in this period is very well-known.

The Abbasid founded Baghdad near the ruins of Tisfun and made it the capital of their empire. During the Abbasid period, Iranians contributed significantly to the development of Islamic culture. The Abbasid Khalifs adopted governmental traditions of the Sasanid; Iranians, such as the famous House of Barmak, gained high rank and status in the government.

However, by the end of this period (early third century of Hijra) popular movements broke out all-over the Iranian soil. Also, a number of old feudal families began to regain their former positions as the disintegration of the Abbasid rule proceeded. The feudal princes that came into power and formed dynasties were of diverse origins:

1) The old feudal families in various regions of Iran; such as the Taheris in Khorasan (206-260 of Hijra), the Samanid in Middle Asia (204-390 H.), the Ziyaris in Gorgan (316-434 H.), the House of Booyeh (324-447 H.) in the west of Iran and Iraq (Euphrates), etc.

2) Rulers who arose from peasant movements and subsequently formed feudal states. Such are the Saffarid in Siestan (247-288 H.), the Alavis in Mazandaran and Gorgan (250-316 H.), Ismaiilis, etc.

3) Former turk slaves of the Abbasid or local courts; such as the Ghaznavi (351-432 H.) turks in Khorasan and Afghanistan, the Seljuk turks (430-530 H.) from Central Asia who wrested power from the Ghaznavis and set up a geographically extensive government in Iran, and the Khwarazmshahis in Central Asia (530-627 H.)

What was common to all these local governments was:

1) Their efforts to extend their domains in opposition to Arab Rule. The Deylamis, a ruling dynasty from the Caspian province of Gilan, conquer Baghdad, and the Seljukis advanced as far as Syria.

2) They were all served by Iranian dignitaries of government and culture, and used the same language- Dari, or modern Persian. The Ghaznavi court is famous for its encouragement of Persian literature, and the famous Shahnameh of Ferdowsi was composed in this period. It was apparently the consummation of efforts to revive the Persian language. Such efforts were centered in Khorasan.

• In reality formation of these dynasties can be considered as expressing efforts by the various peoples of Iran to overthrow the Arab rule. The conquest of power by each new ethnic group meant rather the integration of the victor and the vanquished than the disappearance of the latter. In this way, the central government progressively became the representative of the feudals and chiefs of these peoples.

• In this period of re-Iranianization, unlike the pre-Islamic times, centers of Iranian power and civilization shifted from the west (where the Arabs were still powerful) to the east and north.

• It is noteworthy that even the devastating invasion by the moghols did not create any big changes in the ethnic composition of governments in Iran. The spatial and temporal continuity of what is commonly considered as "Persian" culture was retained and "Persian" acquired the connotation of "elite" rather than a strict ethnic meaning.

This is how Iran looked on the eve of the Moghol Invasion. In the next part I will discuss Moghols, the local nature of power in Kurdestan and the formation of Safavid dynasty.

03. Moghol Invasion to Downfall of Safavid Dynasty

During the period from Moghol Invasion (617 H.) till the founding of the Safavid Dynasty (907 H.), Iran's production is wiped out and the society retrogresses. In the governments which were set up by descendants of the Moghol conquerors, Holakoois, Aljatioon, and Teymooris, not only Iranians gained strictly important roles, but the process of re-Iranianization was speeded up due to popular uprisings and feudal rebellions. The uprising of the Sar-be-daran, Horoofieh, and other popular uprisings, are examples of the latter and feudal rebellions of Choopanis, Jalayeris, etc., are instances of the former. The re-Iranianization found concrete expression in the Persian language as the official literary discourse, the Shi’a religion as the official religion, the system of taxation and the civil law.

The Safavid State, founded in 907 H. by Gezelbash Turks, who had fled the Ottoman territory, especially promoted the ascendancy of the "Persian" element in the central government. They first moved their capital from Tabriz to Ghazvin in their preference of central Iran and then in the same intention moved it from Ghazvin to Esfahan. Shah Abbas, the greatest Safavid King, is alleged to have given considerable tax concession to Esfahan and other parts of central Iran to that end [ibid P.522]. Shiism was formally upheld as the official religion of Modern Iran.

Shiism, rather than "Persianism," became the vehicle of supremacy; and thus we observe the discrimination of other ethnic and national groups to show a religious color.  Discrimination of the Sunnis due to the excesses of some members of Shi’a clergy in the Royal Court causes the maltreatment of the Sunni population in Kurdestan, Turkmanistan, Shirvan, Afghanistan, etc. that in turn evoked popular uprisings. And finally the overthrow of the decaying Safavid Dynasty was effected by the rebellious Sunni Afghans who, led by Mahmud-e Afghan, took the capital city of Esfahan.

In the next part, I will discuss how the power structure of Kurdestan was in this same period.

04. Kurds in Modern Iran-Till Nader Shah

Its favorable, mountainous situation allowed Kurdestan a self-sufficient economy. This, together with its geographical position amidst Arabs, Turks, and Persians, enabled Kurdestan to enjoy relative independence. Feudal families ruled Kurdestan for a long time, and the rule of the Ardalans, began before the fall of the Abbasid, continued during and after the Moghol domination of Iran.

About the Ardalans' rule over Kurdestan, what Amir Sharaf Khan El Badlisi writes in his Sharafnameh may be of some value. He writes, "A man named Baba Ardalan dwelt for some time among the Guran tribe, and toward the end of the reign of the Genghisi Kings brought under his sway the province of Shahra Zool, which came to be famed as Shahr-E-Zoor; and he [renamed] himself Ghobadin-E-Firuz-Sasani; and that the reason for the epithet Shahr-E-Zoor [Forceville], is, according to Hamdullah Mostowfi, that although this city always had Kurd rulers but at different times, he who had the greater force became the ruler." [Sharaf-Nameh P.118]. {In other words something like some European feudal cities which had extensive history of fiefdom. I think the strength of Ashayer in Kurdestan also explains this particular form of feudalism and fiefdom.}

Although Kurdish feudals ruled Kurdestan for more than six-hundred years, they would be under vassalage now for the Arabs, now for the Moghols, or of the Safavids and the Qajars. In 920 H., when Shah Ismaiil Safavi's army was defeated by the Ottomans in the Battle of Chaldoran, a treaty was made between the Shah Ismaiil and Sultan Saleem of Ottoman Empire(now Turkey), according to which Kurdestan was divided between the two countries.

From that date on, the Ardalans principally ruled in the Iranian Kurdestan, and Sanadaj was the seat of their government.

In the reign of Shah Sultan Hossein, the last Safavi King, a fanatical Shi’a governer was appointed to this all-Sunni province. Misdeeds committed by the governor evoked a popular rebellion, and the Ardalans returned to government[Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdestan, Sheikh Mohammad Mardookh, P114]

However, the process of centralization of governments in Iran continued in spite of various setbacks, and it was to engulf Kurdestan despite her resistance and self-sufficiency. This process was primarily determined by the speed and quality of Iran's development of industrial society of which will be said later.

The fall of the Safavid dynasty was accompanied with the invasion of Iran by the Afghans, the Russians, and the Ottomans simultaneously. This was a test of cohesion for the "united" Iran that had been founded by the Safavids, and there was a concerted effort by the peoples and fighting forces of Iran to repulse the aggressors. Thus, Nader came into prominence as outstanding general and national hero, who became king after the war.

In the next section I will follow on Iran and Kurdestan under Nader Shah and after his reign.

05. Kurds in Modern Iran-Nader Shah-Mashrootiat

06. Shi’a Clergy in Mashrootiat-A Brief Note

The Shi’a clergy were divided into two opposite camps during the Constitutional Revolution (Mashrootiat). One mainly consisting of the lower-rank clergy, supported it along with the rest of the Constitutionalists; while the other, headed by Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri and under the banner of "Shari'at" opposed it, siding with the despotic King Mohammad Ali-Shah.

A compromise was apparently reached by including in the constitution an article which allowed five "first-rank" ecclesiastics to be elected to the National Council to verify that the laws enacted did not conflict with Islam. Also, Shiism was proclaimed as the official religion of the country.

Since the reign of Reza Shah in 1925 till the revolutionary-democratic movement of 1978, religion in general did not play any significant role as a socio-political ideology. The revivalism that Iran has since experienced is an extremely important and interesting subject by itself, which lies beyond the scope of this treatise, which I have discussed extensively in Why Shiism Became the Flag of 1979 Iranian Revolution and also in Progressiveness in the Present Epoch.

07. Kurds in Modern Iran-Mashrootiat-Reza Shah

In contrast to Azerbaijan, there was no mass participation by Kurds in the Constitutional Revolution. The reason for this lack of participation should be obvious. The modernist aims of the revolution and its goal of power-sharing could not touch a region that had lived in isolation from the rest of Iran for centuries, a region where feudalism and tribalism held complete sway.

Following the end of Ardalan rule, the elements of modern capitalism were just starting to form in connection to the rest of the Iranian market, but these elements were very weak and vulnerable by fiefdom and tribal relations. And still the general direction of Kurdestan was determined by the feudal and tribal chiefs who were still dreaming to return to the days of isolation and semi-independence. They were far from understanding the strength of the Constitutional Movement and thus did not even recognize their own self-interest to work for power-sharing in the Central Iranian State, the self-interest that some other tribal chiefs of Iran such as Bakhtiari had realized correctly .

It is interesting that the Bakhtiari tribe was mobilized and brought to Tehran after the defeat of the despotic Mohammad Ali-Shah. No doubt, the intention of the Bakhtiari chiefs was not to extend democracy and defend constitutionalism, but to gain a place in the new government that was forming and would be partly pro-capitalist. They knew that it is important to be part of the formation of the new central state and recognized the winning power of democratic capitalism, although they themselves were only interested to be part of the power and not harbinger of the new ways of life.

The feudals of most parts of Iran had learned that to further their own interest, they had to participate in the elite of the central government rather than to buy isolationism from the central government. Unfortunately, an opposite stand of Kurdish feudal, clergy, and tribal chiefs is why, the Kurdish tribesmen were used against the Constitutional fighters of Azerbaijan. Their feudal lords were hoping to regain their lost isolation and semi-independence.

In the first part of Mashrootiat, there was no movement in Kurdestan. Most of the landlords and their dignitaries received the Mashrootiat as though it were no more than a mere shift in the upper echelons of Iran's central government.

Before Mohammad Ali-Shah openly declared Estebdad (Despotism) by bombarding the Parliament, a pro-Constitutional Governor was sent to Kurdestan from Tehran. He was Mirza Ismaiil Khan Seghatol-Molk who contacted Kurdish influential religious and feudal dignitaries in Sanandaj for the purpose of promoting Constitutionalism. Accordingly, popular councils, which had originally sprung up in Tabriz, Tehran, Rasht, etc, were set up. Here is the story as narrated by Sheikh Mardookh himself.

Ayatolah Mardokh, the author of Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdestan, cooperates with Constitutionalists at first and even participates in Anjoman-e Sedaghat (1425 Zighadeh). With the start of Estebdad-e Saghir (Despotism), the previous pro-Mashrooteh governor (i.e. Seghat-ol Molk) is called back and Prince Zafar-ol Saltaneh is assigned as the governor of Kurdestan.

This new governor (i.e. Zafar-ol-Saltaneh) was pro-Estebdad (pro-Despotism) and shut down the Sedaghat, Kargaran, Haghighat, Salahat, Okhovvat, and other associations. At this time, Ayatolah Mardookh who was seemingly pro-Mashrootiat, signs a secret agreement with Moshir Divan( pro-Despotism). This is his agreement in his own words:

"The night of 16th of Ramazan 1326 met secretly with Moshir Divan and agreed that if dolat (government) wins, he protects us and if mellat (Constitutionalists) win, we protect him" [Tarikh-e Kurd va Kurdestan, Sheikh Mardookh, P. 248]

Mardookh is a symbol of the right wing Kurdish landlord and clergy who signed pacts with Sheikh Fazlullah-Nuri and Mohammad Ali-Shah at one time, became Constitutionalist at another time, then cooperated with Salared-dolleh and the Russians, compromised with Germans and Ottomans, and finally became subservient to Reza Shah and the British. His book is a good example of how the vacillations of fiefdom is reflected in the politics of Kurdestan.

But there were also democratic forces. Seyyed Yunis and Sheikh Ebrahim who had a group called "Social Democrat" [Darbareh Mobarezat-e Kurdestan, Hamid Moomeni, P.24].  But these forces were very weak. The undeveloped state of Kurdestan' s market economy, its isolation from the mainstream of Iranian history and its tribalism and fiefdom were the reasons why, contrary to Azerbaijan, such democratic forces (e.g. the social-democratic group) did not gain support in Kurdestan. The weakness of Kurdestan's Bazar, as I said, was due to persistence of feudalism and fiefdom in Kurdestan and the isolationism and seclusion of that region from the rest of Iran. Thus Salared Doleh and Mohammad Ali-Shah considered Kurdestan as their stronghold.

A notable expression of retrogressive role of tribal chiefs in Kurdestan is the rebellion of the Shakkak Tribe, led by Ismaiil Agha Simku, with the massacre of Assyrians and Armenians in Khoi and Salmas in North-Western Azerbaijan. Of the "banner of Kurdestan Liberation" which Ismaiil Agha had presumably raised, Ahmad Kasravi, the prominent historian of the Constitutional Movement writes:

"Now Simku is prepared for and hoisted the banner of 'Kurdestan liberation'. And what has he been doing? Has he assembled the Kurds to prepare them for a free life and self-government? Is he writing a constitution for Kurdestan? Is he making an effort to do away the divisions among the Kurds? ... No, he does not consider such things as 'liberation of Kurdestan'...He plunders villages, tramples upon sown land, demands money of the robbed and destitute people in Lackestan... that is what the 'liberation of Kurdestan' means, and that is the result the European politicians desire."[Tarikh-e Hejdah Saleh-e Azarbayjan, Vol2 P. 831]

This was the nomadic state of tribal life at the time of decaying of feudalism in Iran exerting a severer pressure than elsewhere on the development of industrialism in Kurdestan. Actually Sheikh Mardookh in his aforementioned book gives a good picture of the anarchy created by the tribal chiefs and tells how hazardous they had made the business of commerce and transportation in Kurdestan. The emergence of Reza Shah's dictatorship in 1925 meant the unfolding of a new period in Iranian history which is written in the next part.

08. Kurds in Modern Iran-Reza Shah-IRI

The emergence of Reza Shah's dictatorship in 1925 meant the unfolding of a new period in Iranian history. The centralized, "modernizing" administration had subsumed the progressive aims of the Constitutional Movement in one of the earliest types of neo-colonial societies.

Feudalism in agriculture remained, but big landownership became increasingly free and could pass into the hands of rich merchants. Within the framework of disintegrated feudalism and dependence, commerce and industry experienced unprecedented (for Iran) development. Looked at superficially, it appeared that "national unity", "modernization", and "nationalism" or "Iranian Renaissance" were safely and rapidly materializing.

The dominant imperialist power in the region was Britain, and it, too, was quite satisfied with this arrangement, which safeguarded all its major interests. The new form of Iranian state was able to avoid the type of conflicts and clashes that occurred between Iran and British imperialism during and after First World War, because it was doing away with fiefdom and anarchy which was prevalent at the end of Qajar dynasty.

The birth of the Soviet Union was one more reason for the British to favor a strong centralized state in Iran. Ahmad Shah was too weak and disinterested to ever accomplish what was expected from him by the British. Seyed-Zia failed in his efforts to rise to power and so the choice for early neo-colonialist experiment of the British in Iran was none but Reza Khan who succeeded in his coup. Thus the British supported Reza Khan.

Rebellion chiefs and tribes were easily eliminated or subdued by Reza Shah's armed forces. Among these were Ismaiil Agha Shakkak (Simku) and his men, who were apparently put to use by the British in Musol for the purpose of acquiring the oil-rich region.

In the "calm and security" provided by Reza Shah's dictatorship, the Kurdish capitalists, in close connection with the capitalists of Kermanshah, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, started to make a new growth. But due to Kurdestan's limited participation in the general primitive formation of capitalism in Iran, it has been PURELY commercial, whereas the Iranian capitalists as a whole were MAINLY commercial. Moreover, the absence of Kurdish elite in the Iran's power structure was another disadvantage at the time of capitalist growth for Kurdestan.

Thus, if the bourgeoisification of Kurdestan means at the same time the formation of the Kurdish nation, and vice versa, this process has, since 1925, been linked with the all-Iranian development of capitalism.

There should be no doubt that the capitalist and modern constituent in Kurdestan is not in favor of secession and isolationism from Iran. Because the Kurdish capitalist and modernists are well aware that in the absence of armed forces of the central government, the revival of tribalism, the anarchy of fiefdom, the supremacy of chiefs and feudals, and the loss of security is inevitable.

In the days following the fall of Reza Khan (after Shahrivar 1320) and the general chaos in Iran, during 1945-46, the Kurdish capitalists accepted separation from Iran to some extent, but only because on one hand Iran as a whole was very unstable and secondly the presence of the Red Army deterred tribal-feudal anarchy and economic relations with the Soviet Union had temporarily replaced those with the rest of Iran.

But when the Red Army left, following the Stalin-Ghavam pact, and when economic relations with the Soviets narrowed, Kurdish capitalists were frightened at the prospect of separation. More so because they saw the chiefs and feudals gaining power in the Democratic Party of Kurdestan. The conciliation/agreement in 1946 between Qazi Mohammad, the Party leader and the Central Government has to be reviewed in this light, rather than as a deceptive tactic by Premier Ghavamus Saltana.

Another factor contributing to the alienation of the Kurdish capitalists from the Democratic Party Leadership was the presence of the Barzani Peshmarga as the main armed force of the Mahabad Republic, for it not only suggested separation, but also the idea of "The Unity of Greater Kurdestan" which the Kurdish capitalists would never welcome because they have inseparable interests in the rest of the Iranian market.

At this point I am going to make a digression from history and discuss the issue of Greater Kurdestan and Autonomy of Kurdestan in the NEXT part.

But before ending this part, I need to mention that both during Reza Shah, and during the Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, the presence of the Kurds in the Iranian central elite has been extremely limited, because of the historical reasons that I have written in this paper, and it is important to note that any government in Iran should pay particular attention to encouraging the Kurdish participation in the central government.

At the same time, both during the Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, the Kurdish isolationism was more and more replaced with closeness with the rest of Iran. The current aspirations of modernists and Kurdish people are more cry for religious and national freedom than a desire to be isolated from Iran. Kurds are Shafei Muslims and it bothers them to hear insults to Omar! This simple!

Movements such as Sharif-Zadeh and Molla Avareh at the time of the Shah did not contribute to any change in the status of Kurds in the Iranian Central Government. This is why I am not discussing them here. They were part of the general Iranian movement against the Shah's dictatorship.

Actually Sharif-Zadeh (1345 H.) and his group were predecessors to other Iranian opposition groups and their work was literally continued in other parts of Iran. These movements more and more showed that Kurdestan is really not a separate feudal state anymore, and it is sharing in the good and bad of whatever the rest of Iran is experiencing.

09. The Theory of Greater Kurdestan

Here I am making a diversion to explicate a theory that is sometimes heard from some uninformed Iranian Kurds as a solution to the problems of Kurdestan.

Basically the Unity of Greater Kurdestan has been a demand mostly desired by the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds and except for some uninformed individuals, the Iranian Kurds have never had such a desire.

The reason is because the Iranian and Ottoman Kurdestan have separated since the time of Shah Ismaiil (War of Chaldoran), as I noted before, and that is about four centuries ago. And even the result was that the Iranian Kurdestan became a semi-independent state ruled by Ardalans. So the Iranian Kurds were as free as one could be, and had no interest to join the other parts of Kurdestan. They are as separate as the Austrians and Germans.

But the Ottoman part of Kurdestan was divided between Turkey, Iraq, and Syria in 1920 [actually between the then Ottomans, British, and French], following the end of First World War. This is why those previously Ottoman sections of Kurdestan are yearning for reunification. They had lived together in their primitive capitalist development, which could have led to formation of a nation-state. But Iranian Kurdestan has done that development with the rest of Iran, rather than with the previous Kurdestan of Ottoman Empire, as I have shown it in this article.

Whether it is realistic or not for the Turkish and Iraqi Kurds to reunify is really not my interest here. It depends on many factors. But for Iran, it is definitely a bad plan. I am just emphasizing here that Iranian Kurdestan is as Iranian as all the other parts of Iran. Only being Sunni and under religious and cultural oppression, some uninformed Kurds may sigh for the Greater Iranian Kurdestan as a nice dream, but the informed Kurds know that it is more of a nightmare than a sweet dream, where tribal chiefs will destroy all the progress that has already, belatedly, been made in Kurdestan.

Finally the issue of establishing democratic rights of people of Kurdestan and other parts of Iran within a federal system has nothing to do with the "Theory of Unity of Greater Kurdestan". Iraqi government even at Saddam's time, had recognized some form of autonomy for Iraq’s Kurdestan and today's Iraq is a federal regime.  In fact, having similar rights for all provinces and regions of Iran, regardless of nationality, religion, or ethnic background, is what is needed.

It is really unfortunate that neither the Shah's government nor IRI have recognized such rights for Iran's Kurdestan and other regions of Iran, such as Azerbaijan, or Baluchestan, or other religions such as the Baha'is or Jews, etc. Why should an Armenian kid be forced to learn how to do voozo or read namaz? Why should an Azeri child not have a choice to take Turkish literature class at school?

These things have nothing to do with separation or Greater Kurdestan. These are rights that all Iranian minorities demand. I think the Iranians who have spent 20 years in the US, may demand English class for their kids, if they go to school in Iran. I think any political group and Iranian state should recognize these rights. These are not secessionism or forming Greater Kurdestan, Greater Azerbaijan, Greater Armenia, Greater Assyria, etc, these are simple recognition of cultural and political needs of different nationalities and ethnic groups of Iran.

Finally I think the Turkish Kurds and Iranian Kurds share a language and culture, just like many Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, or the Arab states . So they watch the same movies without sub-title, but sincerely I think that is where the commonalty ends. The Kurds of Iran have a lot of stake in Iran and I doubt it if they would ever give it up.

10. Tribes and Tribalism

{In the following part I am discussing "Tribes and Tribalism in Kurdestan". This section is based on different sources including a study published by Amir Hooshang Keshavarz and Mir Seyyed Ali Nazem Razavi entitled "ASHAYER VA MASAYEL-E TOWSE'AH” [Tribes and Problems of Development], published Tir, 1355, by Faculty of Social Sciences and Cooperation, Tehran University.}

In a study by two Iranians (noted above), tribes in Iran have been classified into "big" and small ones. Big tribes include Turkmans, Shahsavans, Bakhtiaris, BuyerAhmadis, Qashghaiis one-or-two tribes in Kurdestan. These tribes in turn are divided into three types according to their mode of life and production:

1) Tribes of which about 80% are mobile and have summer and winter abodes as well as migration routes, such as the Bakhtiaris.

2) Tribes of which about 50% migrate back and forth, and the rest, a greater portion lives in Summer Places, and a smaller portion in Winter Places; such as the BuyerAhmadi in Kohgiluyeh.

3) Tribes which dwell in one place but have to move their herds from place to place for grazing and feeding. Such are the Turkmen and Kurdish tribes.

Tribal mode of life and ownership was dealt a severe blow during the reign of Reza Shah, but was revived in the turbulent years of 1941-53, owing partly to the weakening of central government and partly due to the joint efforts of imperialism and domestic reaction, to frustrate the all-Iranian democratic-revolutionary movement.

Tribal chiefs carried out plunder with backing of the British in that period. For example, Mohammad Rashid Khan Baneh-i became an important figure in the area by defeating Mahmud Khan-e Kani Sanan in Mariwan.

Mohammad Rashid Khan and the like appeared as supporters of the Mahabad Republic (1945-46), but withdrew as soon as the central government forces attacked Mahabad and in the later years, they worked hand in hand with the British to suppress the people's movements in these areas.

The mobilization by the British, American, and domestic reaction of the Quashghaii and other tribes in the South (1944-46), the use of Arab tribesmen in Khuzestan in an armed clash with the striking oil workers in the Summer of 1946, the instigation of the Bakhtiari tribes in Central Iran and the Javanrudis in Kermanshah in 1952-53 are further examples of the reactionary role played by tribalism in the recent history of of Iran.

Having contributed its share to the reestablishment of a police state with the coup d'etat of August 1953, tribalism suffered another setback; for now the central government was severely in the hands of reaction and imperialism, and the services of the chiefs were no longer needed.

However, in the border regions of Kurdestan, and in Dezli, Javanrood, Sardasht, etc., the Shah's regime could not dispense with such services. In those regions armed tribesmen served as "government militia".

The Shakkak tribe, the most important in Northern Kurdestan, the Malekshahis, the Ghalkhanis, etc., now comprise the nomadic tribes of Kurdestan. These have not been satisfactorily studied as yet. What is certain is that in the Southmost and Northmost areas of Kurdestan and also in the border areas, the tribal social and economic life is still alive.

Moreover, many of the villages, where small landownership prevails, are still largely under the sway of tribal customs and traditions: blood revenge is observed in some small villages of Kamyaran, "clan heads" in Sardasht, where small landownership predominates, and they still wield great influence and even keep bands of armed attendants, and the kidnapping of girls for marriage is still practiced (this practice was very common in many old cultures of the world).

Since the downfall of the Pahlavi regime in February 1979, tribal chiefs of Kurdestan have shown various political stands. Some have shown loyalty to the central government, Islamic Republic of Iran; but this "loyalty" to a Shi’a state is neither strong nor likely to become so. Some others, notably those of Javanrud, Pawa, and Uraman in the south, and of Khoi, Salmas, and Eshnuya in the north, have tended toward "independence".  Still others have become supporters of the Kurdestan Democratic Party. Some other clan heads have become agents of the Iraq’s Baa'th government, in the violent suppression of the Kurdish people's movements. Finally some have joined it.

In different periods of Kurdestan's movement the tribal groups have existed, for example Barzani tribe was the armed forces of the Mahabad Republic in 1945-6 and also they were active in the 1961-1975 Kurdish movements.  After 1975 treaty of Shah and Saddam, they were disarmed.  But the remnants of the Barzani army, which had fled to Iran in 1975, were reorganized by Barzani's sons and called "Qiada-ye Mowaghat".  Soon they dropped the "Mowaghat" (provisional) from their name, and called themselves Hizb-e Democrat-e Kurdestan-e Iraq.   Massoud Barzani was chosen as the first provincial head of Kurdistan of Iraq in the new provisional government of Iraq in 2005.

In summary, the tribal relations have been economically declining, although they continue to exist in social and political areas by stressing some ethnic and religious inclinations of the people.  The autonomy desired by the tribal chiefs is different from federalism desired by the modern society in Kurdestan.  The former want anarchy, fiefdom, isolationism and destruction of Kurdestan whereas the latter want checks and balances to ensure democratic rights at the provincial and local levels.

11. Final Word

Finally I would like to note that I have not reviewed the intellectual and peasant uprisings during the end of the Shah and the rise of Islamic Republic of Iran periods.   I think the former is not really much different from the rest of Iran and should be studied as part of the review of Iranian intellectual thought and the latter is beyond the scope of this treatise.  Here my intention was simply to investigate the presence of Kurds in the Iran's central government.

As far as Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is concerned, I do not have any detailed knowledge of the Iranian elite at this time and so I really cannot judge what the ethnic make-up of IRI is. I know some clergy like Mofti-Zadeh in Kurdestan at the beginning supported IRI and some like Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini did not. But whether any of them is part of Iran's elite, I would seriously doubt that.

I do not know what the IRI and the various social, cultural, and political groups of Iran are doing in Iran's Kurdestan at this time.  I just know that the lack of tolerance at the beginning of IRI caused a lot of killings of innocent people from both IRI supporters and its opponents.

I hope that this paper and other educational efforts can help the growth of the dialogue between different peoples of Iran and thus help the improvement of tolerance and diversity of the present and future central governments of Iran.  Kurds, Azeris, Baluches, Arabs, Lors, Bakhtiaris, Ghashghais, Assyrians, Armenians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Sunnis, Baha'is, Women, and all other ethnic, national, cultural, or religious groups make what is called Iran today.

If any central government in Iran, at present or in the future, does not recognize the rightful aspirations of these diverse groups, I really doubt it if that government can claim to be representing what we call Iran.

Sam Ghandchi

1981

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* This series on Kurdestan and the following appendix were written in 1981.  It was first posted on Usenet newsgroup on May 1, 1994.

Appendix 1-Kurdestan's Agriculture