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Article2
Response to Article1
By
CCC
Here is
CCC’s first response to ghandchi:
*************************************************************
Sam
Ghandchi (samg@netcom.com) wrote:
>AAA,
an SCI reader, in his message says that he has lost a brother
>and
many close friends and comrades. I can only sympathize with
>his
loss and say that yes, Iranians have buried so many of their
>brightest
intellectuals in mass graves in the last century, without
>even
achieving half of what some nations such as
>achieved.
>Why?
I think because of sensational assessments of the world and
>our
society; and replacing brevity and fearlessness contests for
>reason.
I am sorry to be so harsh and cold-blooded in my response
>to AAA's
tragic report, but I do not want to see the sacrifice of
>another
soul for sensationalism. I am afraid that Iranian
>intellectuals
have already lost too much by resorting to
>sensationalism,
especially in the last four decades and I prefer to
>have
my reason, rather than my emotions, to direct my actions
But
isn't this a bit simplistic? Lets see
>AAA's
final call for action goes as follows:
]In
summary, my message is the following. First,
]revolutionary
change to take it back from the IRI's rule. Second, it is
]not
clear that any leading opposition group will be a practical force
]for
implementing this revolutionary change and therefore, a new
]independent
force must be created to fill this void or otherwise we
]can
look forward to living in conditions similar to our neighbors in
]
]NOW
AND WE MUST TAKE THE LEADERSHIP ROLE THAT WILL
]COMPLEMENT
THE CHANGE WITHIN THE IRANIAN SOCIETY.
>The
above analysis reminds me of the period after the 1953 coup
>after
the overthrow of Dr. Mossadegh's government. Many Iranian
>intellectuals
who were tired of the politics and defeats of Tudeh
>Party
and Jebheh Melli chose two new sensational alternatives. The
>first
one was the Cheriki leftist guerrilla movement and the second
>one
was the Shariati mystical-Islamic movement.
Now,
there is a (rather large) gap between the two. Both the guerrilla
movement
and Shariati's satrted in the 60's - and both were effected
by another
event, the 1963 uprising against the Shah's "white
revolution".
The 10 year in between does amke a difference!
>The
former felt dead in the quiet times of 1953-1962. Pooyan called
>the
intellectuals of the time BAGHA (meaning status quo)
>supporters.
Indeed,
Pooyan was, first and formost, addressing the Tudeh party
members
with his thesis (again in the mid-sixties). It wasn't
addressed
at intellectuals as a group, most of whom at the time were
increasingly
being attracted by the regime and absorbed in the
system.
Unless, of course, you only mean the opposition minority.
>Ahmad-Zadeh
looked to Regi Dubre's theories for action and being
>alive.
They finally were consolidated in the Fadaeean Khalgh :
>organization.
>The
latter group, Shariati and his Hosseiniiieh-Ershad, created a
>mixture
of Existentialism and Islam in a mystical fashion. They
>attacked
liberalism by undermining rationalism and they idealized
>emotionalism
by choosing the path of heart. They partly joined the
>forces
that finally are part of the current regime; and partly became
>the
body of Mojahedin organization which was previously formed
>by
the radical elements of Nehzat Azadi.
>Actually
the above two tendencies among the Iranian intellectuals
>for
over 30 years were the reasons why the liberalism did not grow
>in
>continued
from the time of Mashrootiat. People like Alameh
>Dehkhoda
continued that tradition even after Mossadegh's fall
>Dehkhoda
himself was always a supporter of Mossadegh
>Unfortunately,
the new intellectuals of the 60s had no patience for
>this
liberalism, which was already tarred by Tudeh Party within the
>opposition
and was damaged by the Shah's repression from the
>other
end.
Again,
it is not clear to what period you are referring to as the "over
30
years". The fact of the matter is that the 25 year period between
the
CIA-backed coup of 1953 to the anti-monarchy revolution of
1979 is
divided almost 50-50 by a period of stagantion after the
coup in
which the Shah sought to strengthen his rule by oppression
and the
use of SAVAK, and the other half in which the movements
you
referred to emerged - and then crushed (in the case of armed
struggle).
While I
quite agree that the lack of liberal tradition in Iranian
politics
has been a major factor in the growth of violence and/or
mystical/religious
oriented groupings during the 10-15 years before
the
revolution, I found your analysis of the reasons for the first
rather
simplistic. Furtheremore, classifying intellectuals as if they are
a
homogeneous political groupings and then blaming them for
whatever
happened to Iran in this (and some other) periods is
bordering
on naivity. This sort of "analysis" is used universally by
many
opposing groups: the monarchist blame intellectuals for the
revolution,
the mollah's blame them for keeping the Shah in power
for the
period he was in power, and many people on the left also
doing
the same.
The last
bastion of liberalism in Iran was crashed by the overthrow
of
Mossaddegh. It was the failure of liberalism in the ten years after
that
which led to the emergence of radicalism from whithin (as you
also
observed). The Bazargan government was liberal only in name: it
could
not and would not defend and safeguard the most basic human
rights
against the onslught of the reactionary mollahs. It was ready
to
compromise anything for power (unlike Mossaddegh who would
stand
against the Shah whenever matters of principle were at stake).
And
true, the radical left (both Islamic and Marxist) had no time and
place
for such "luxuries" as human rights in their agenda, either.
It
looks as if the Iranian people have had no choice but to go through
"trial
and error". They tried liberalism (in the shape of Mossaddegh
government)
and failed by the coup. They tried voilence in the
sixties/seventies.
That failed too as all these movements were
crushed
by the might of SAVAK torture machines. They then turned
to religious
salvation - and got the IRI with all its barbarism,
devastation
and regressive records. The signs are that this latest
experience
is leading many back to liberalism again - with a
difference.
The political changes both inside and outside Iran have
created
a more favourable conditions for the growth of liberalism.
One can
easily witness that the argument for violence and extremism
is
losing ground in the Iranian politics, and the forces of reason and
secularism/liberalism
are gaining grounds. What it lacks is a political
leadership
to turn this new sentimentality into a political force and
affect
changes for the betterment of the society.
-CCC